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	<title>Comments for Everything Finance</title>
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		<title>Comment on The Day of Reckoning For State Pension Plans by Day of Reckoning for State Pension Plans, Continued « Everything Finance</title>
		<link>http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/2010/03/22/the-day-of-reckoning-for-state-pension-plans/#comment-952</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Day of Reckoning for State Pension Plans, Continued « Everything Finance]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Oct 2012 15:16:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/?p=503#comment-952</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] renewed interest in my March 2010 blog post, I should point out that I made some (relatively minor) updates to the calculations during the [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] renewed interest in my March 2010 blog post, I should point out that I made some (relatively minor) updates to the calculations during the [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on Government Unions and Public Sector Compensation by brian smith</title>
		<link>http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/2011/10/16/government-unions-and-public-sector-compensation/#comment-935</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[brian smith]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Aug 2012 17:54:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/?p=1249#comment-935</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The comparisons outlined omit another dimension that seems to be consistently overlooked.  As a retired economist, I am always a bit surprised by the persistent omission of an important factor.  This is the disregard of huge difference in &#039;lay-off&#039; risk between employment in the public and private sectors.  

This is the equivalent of credit risk in investing in bonds.  US Government bonds return less because there is essentially zero risk of default.  Greater safety involves a trade-off for lower returns.  The risk spread quite substantial.  Even though there have been some lay-offs in the public sector over the past couple of years, their magnitude is trivial in comparison with the carnage in the private sector.  Plus in the public sector, stringent seniority rules put most of the risk on new relatively low-paid hires like untenured teachers, further insulating most employees from risk.  

When investing one&#039;s human capital in a career path, the security of employment is the equivalent of credit risk.  Accordingly, the relevant comparison in the public vs. private sector analysis is not just the total compensation package but the risk-adjusted total compensation package.

I certainly do not think that new teachers are overpaid -- they are the sacrificial goats for poor past employment practices.  Still, public sector employees have to realize that voters will be increasingly unwilling to fund compensation and employment stability that is clearly better than they can usually achieve themselves.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The comparisons outlined omit another dimension that seems to be consistently overlooked.  As a retired economist, I am always a bit surprised by the persistent omission of an important factor.  This is the disregard of huge difference in &#8216;lay-off&#8217; risk between employment in the public and private sectors.  </p>
<p>This is the equivalent of credit risk in investing in bonds.  US Government bonds return less because there is essentially zero risk of default.  Greater safety involves a trade-off for lower returns.  The risk spread quite substantial.  Even though there have been some lay-offs in the public sector over the past couple of years, their magnitude is trivial in comparison with the carnage in the private sector.  Plus in the public sector, stringent seniority rules put most of the risk on new relatively low-paid hires like untenured teachers, further insulating most employees from risk.  </p>
<p>When investing one&#8217;s human capital in a career path, the security of employment is the equivalent of credit risk.  Accordingly, the relevant comparison in the public vs. private sector analysis is not just the total compensation package but the risk-adjusted total compensation package.</p>
<p>I certainly do not think that new teachers are overpaid &#8212; they are the sacrificial goats for poor past employment practices.  Still, public sector employees have to realize that voters will be increasingly unwilling to fund compensation and employment stability that is clearly better than they can usually achieve themselves.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Why an MBS-Treasury swap is better policy than the Treasury twist by Arvind Krishnamurthy</title>
		<link>http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/2012/07/25/why-an-mbs-treasury-swap-is-better-policy-than-the-treasury-twist/#comment-919</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Arvind Krishnamurthy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Aug 2012 17:45:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/?p=1448#comment-919</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[John, you make a good point, thanks.  But keep in mind that almost all central banks engage in activist policy as they are setting a key asset price, the fed funds rate.  I think what you are really getting as is whether the Fed should be doing more activism, given all of the stimulus they have already provided. Plausibly the benefits of a QE3 are much less than there were in QE1, and perhaps the costs as you outline are high enough that they should not act -- which is what they have chosen for now.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>John, you make a good point, thanks.  But keep in mind that almost all central banks engage in activist policy as they are setting a key asset price, the fed funds rate.  I think what you are really getting as is whether the Fed should be doing more activism, given all of the stimulus they have already provided. Plausibly the benefits of a QE3 are much less than there were in QE1, and perhaps the costs as you outline are high enough that they should not act &#8212; which is what they have chosen for now.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Why an MBS-Treasury swap is better policy than the Treasury twist by John</title>
		<link>http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/2012/07/25/why-an-mbs-treasury-swap-is-better-policy-than-the-treasury-twist/#comment-917</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[John]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Aug 2012 00:07:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/?p=1448#comment-917</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[This is nice work and the conclusion is reasonable. The only thing I would question is why we all assume that such activist Fed policy is appropriate at this point. In fact, the uncertainty caused by unconventional policy is likely not positive. Instead of letting markets clear, the Fed is purposefully manipulating prices for these assets and causing capital misallocation by definition. . Is a homeowner well served longer term by a subsidized rate if a few years later rates are higher and a house is underwater?  This is more a policy question and not a criticism of your work which is valid.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is nice work and the conclusion is reasonable. The only thing I would question is why we all assume that such activist Fed policy is appropriate at this point. In fact, the uncertainty caused by unconventional policy is likely not positive. Instead of letting markets clear, the Fed is purposefully manipulating prices for these assets and causing capital misallocation by definition. . Is a homeowner well served longer term by a subsidized rate if a few years later rates are higher and a house is underwater?  This is more a policy question and not a criticism of your work which is valid.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Breaking Through the Zero Lower Bound by The Financialist</title>
		<link>http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/2012/07/10/breaking-through-the-zero-lower-bound/#comment-904</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[The Financialist]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Jul 2012 20:44:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/?p=1443#comment-904</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Good post, thought you might find this video Q&amp;A with Credit Suisse  economist , Oliver Adler, interesting. He  outlines what he thinks are the next actions of the ECB and other central banks, given the slowing global economy. In short over the next six to twelve months expect continued stimulus, driven by central banks.

http://www.thefinancialist.com/central-banks-to-continue-fighting-global-slowdown-ecb-credit-suisse-oliver-adler/]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Good post, thought you might find this video Q&amp;A with Credit Suisse  economist , Oliver Adler, interesting. He  outlines what he thinks are the next actions of the ECB and other central banks, given the slowing global economy. In short over the next six to twelve months expect continued stimulus, driven by central banks.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.thefinancialist.com/central-banks-to-continue-fighting-global-slowdown-ecb-credit-suisse-oliver-adler/" rel="nofollow">http://www.thefinancialist.com/central-banks-to-continue-fighting-global-slowdown-ecb-credit-suisse-oliver-adler/</a></p>
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		<title>Comment on The ‘bank jog’ is forcing Germany to dramatically increase its financial commitment to Spain and Greece by patriotgirl</title>
		<link>http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/2012/05/30/the-bank-jog-is-forcing-germany-to-dramatically-increase-its-financial-commitment-to-spain-and-greece/#comment-903</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[patriotgirl]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 05 Jul 2012 21:40:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/?p=1440#comment-903</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Buy commodities and gold.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Buy commodities and gold.</p>
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		<title>Comment on The ‘bank jog’ is forcing Germany to dramatically increase its financial commitment to Spain and Greece by patriotgirl</title>
		<link>http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/2012/05/30/the-bank-jog-is-forcing-germany-to-dramatically-increase-its-financial-commitment-to-spain-and-greece/#comment-902</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[patriotgirl]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 05 Jul 2012 21:40:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/?p=1440#comment-902</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[collapse ahead!]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>collapse ahead!</p>
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		<title>Comment on The ‘bank jog’ is forcing Germany to dramatically increase its financial commitment to Spain and Greece by patriotgirl</title>
		<link>http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/2012/05/30/the-bank-jog-is-forcing-germany-to-dramatically-increase-its-financial-commitment-to-spain-and-greece/#comment-901</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[patriotgirl]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 05 Jul 2012 21:37:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/?p=1440#comment-901</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Looks like the Euro is going to collapse.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Looks like the Euro is going to collapse.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Much Ado About Facebook by Ann Sherman</title>
		<link>http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/2012/05/26/much-ado-about-facebook/#comment-900</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ann Sherman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 30 Jun 2012 15:25:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/?p=1401#comment-900</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The way &quot;bookbuilding&quot; (the main US method) works is that there&#039;s frequent communication between the bankers and investors.  During the week and a half to two weeks of the road show (Facebook began its road show on a Monday and started trading on Friday of the next week; they never start trading on a Monday), people in New York who were at the first day of the road show got a call the next day, while the road show was in Boston.  On day two, those first investors had a chance to say how many shares they&#039;d take at various prices, but the orders weren&#039;t binding.

These &quot;indications of interest&quot; are recorded - the idea behind the name bookbuilding is that they&#039;re building or filling the order book.  For Facebook, the book was &#039;filled&#039; (one time) by about Thursday or maybe even Wednesday of the first week, according to press rumors.  But the New York and Boston investors that attended the road show in the first two days would keep getting calls to update them, and all investors could change their orders based on how things were going.  There are some investors that won&#039;t place orders until the offer is at least two times subscribed - those are free riders, obviously, but they may still get a few shares if they&#039;re good overall customers.  And then there are well respected investors that have their own strong idea on the price, and the issuer may have to price lower to get those investors into the offering.  Last week I had dinner with someone closely involved with the Google IPO who said that Google, in the end, had 5 top investors that Google especially wanted to have in the offering, and so they chose the price in part to make sure they got those five (it was &quot;dirty Dutch&quot;, so they had the option of pricing below clearing).

We should remember that Facebook is only one offering.  It was a mess, but it&#039;s even trickier to price these very hot, high demand offerings.  Just a few days before trading, GE announced that it was no longer going to advertise on Facebook because the adds didn&#039;t work, and this news made no difference in the demand for the shares.

By the way, your colleague Ravi Jagannathan is an expert on IPO auctions.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The way &#8220;bookbuilding&#8221; (the main US method) works is that there&#8217;s frequent communication between the bankers and investors.  During the week and a half to two weeks of the road show (Facebook began its road show on a Monday and started trading on Friday of the next week; they never start trading on a Monday), people in New York who were at the first day of the road show got a call the next day, while the road show was in Boston.  On day two, those first investors had a chance to say how many shares they&#8217;d take at various prices, but the orders weren&#8217;t binding.</p>
<p>These &#8220;indications of interest&#8221; are recorded &#8211; the idea behind the name bookbuilding is that they&#8217;re building or filling the order book.  For Facebook, the book was &#8216;filled&#8217; (one time) by about Thursday or maybe even Wednesday of the first week, according to press rumors.  But the New York and Boston investors that attended the road show in the first two days would keep getting calls to update them, and all investors could change their orders based on how things were going.  There are some investors that won&#8217;t place orders until the offer is at least two times subscribed &#8211; those are free riders, obviously, but they may still get a few shares if they&#8217;re good overall customers.  And then there are well respected investors that have their own strong idea on the price, and the issuer may have to price lower to get those investors into the offering.  Last week I had dinner with someone closely involved with the Google IPO who said that Google, in the end, had 5 top investors that Google especially wanted to have in the offering, and so they chose the price in part to make sure they got those five (it was &#8220;dirty Dutch&#8221;, so they had the option of pricing below clearing).</p>
<p>We should remember that Facebook is only one offering.  It was a mess, but it&#8217;s even trickier to price these very hot, high demand offerings.  Just a few days before trading, GE announced that it was no longer going to advertise on Facebook because the adds didn&#8217;t work, and this news made no difference in the demand for the shares.</p>
<p>By the way, your colleague Ravi Jagannathan is an expert on IPO auctions.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Pensions in MuniLand by The Saturday Morning Post: Quick hits on politics &#38; more in RI &#124; WPRI.com Blogs</title>
		<link>http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/2012/02/29/pensions-in-muniland/#comment-896</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[The Saturday Morning Post: Quick hits on politics &#38; more in RI &#124; WPRI.com Blogs]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 23 Jun 2012 09:01:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/?p=1333#comment-896</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] on historic market returns. At the other end is Josh Rauh, who argues a risk-free rate should be used as long as pension promises are ironclad. Governing&#8217;s Girard Miller recently weighed in [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] on historic market returns. At the other end is Josh Rauh, who argues a risk-free rate should be used as long as pension promises are ironclad. Governing&#8217;s Girard Miller recently weighed in [...]</p>
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